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Socio-political Rationale or Rationalisation?
Industrial decentralisation in South Africa may be
viewed in two different ways. The first is to regard it
as a tool in the policy of 'separate development'
aimed at restructuring the socio-political system
[Bell 1973a], while the second considers it, together
with other key aspects of separate development
such as 'homelands', as providing no more than an
intellectual disguise for a policy which is designed
to maintain White economic power based on the
control of resources, notably abundant supplies of
cheap labour [Legassick and Wolpe 1976].
It is my contention that South Africa since 1948
can be analysed in a realistic way only by referring
to the driving forces behind Afrikaner nationalism.
The party which came to power in that ,year was
motivated by three forces. First, the determination
that never again should the Afrikaner be ruled by
others. Since 'others' would be most probably Afri-
can nationalists, this meant, second, that racial
segregation was regarded as necessary in the socio-
political sphere. The third force was an economic
one, ie the conversion of the Afrikaner's position of
economic inferiority to one of equality with
English-speaking Whites.
Although some useful insights are contributed by
proponents of the second view, my experience of
the Afrikaner nationalist convinces me that the first
approach is more appropriate. Historical, psycho-
logical, racial and economic factors have all
influenced the actions of the National Party (NP) in
power. The theoretical framework of separate de-
velopment, formulated from the early l940s, was
inspired by visions of Afrikaner political domina-
tion and of racial segregation rather than by visions
of Afrikaner economic prosperity [de Klerk, 1976:
ch 9]. The 'Afrikaner-English' economic gap has to
a large extent been diminished thanks to the NPs
use of political power for the purpose of gaining
economic power. There has been some dilution of
racial segregation, although not of a fundamental
nature. But the continued predominance of the first
driving force, Afrikaner nationalist political power,
is illustrated by the proposed new constitution
which in effect guarantees NP (as opposed to
White) rule in the 'common area'1 of South Africa
(CASA).
The idea of decentralisation had been hinted at in
the 1930s when rural-urban migration by both
whites and Africans was causing official concern.
The African component of this townward drift was
further stimulated by the demands of the war
economy, and the question of urban Africans
became a key political point. During the immediate
post-war years three industrial plants were estab-
lished in African areas as part of a scheme to slow
down migration. Industrial decentralisation was
also suggested by the Fagan Commission which, in
the last days of United Party rule, recommended
that the permanent presence of Africans in the
urban areas be acknowledged. The new NP
government, however, could not agree. Instead it
considered Africans as temporary urban sojourners
ultimately to be resettled in the Reserves. The
Tomlinson Commission, appointed to investigate
the economic development of the Reserves, re-
ported in 1954 with the recommendation that
industry be decentralised to the Reserves as a major
instrument in their development, rather than to
'border areas', je industrial estates in CASA but
adjoining the Reserves. This was rejected by the
government in a 1956 White Paper on the grounds
that industrial investment in the Reserves would
lead to White domination in these areas and that
this would be contrary to the principles of separate
development.
When the government finally established the
machinery for industrial decentralisation in 1960,
however, it justified its step by using the 'costs of
urban concentration' argument so popular in many
countries. Perhaps it believed that the private
sector would be more easily swayed by an eco-
nomic rather than a political case. But apart from
the fact that there was no empirical evidence to
support this contention in South Africa with its
relatively small cities, the choice of 'growth point'
locations clearly shows that the real reason for
decentralisation was political, not economic. An
official policy of decentralisation existed only
because of the policy of separate development, its
aim being to facilitate racial segregation by increas-
I The use of the terms 'homelands' and 'common area' is for the
purpose of convenience only and should not be taken as indi-
cating the author's approval of government policy. The
common area has been inhabited by all races; the homelands in
contrast have been reserved for exclusive African occupation
and were in fact known as 'Reserves' until about I 960
10 Bulletin, 1980, vol. Il no.4, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
ing the proportion of the African population
residing in the Reserves [Bell 1 973a]. It was for this
reason that the selection of growth points was based
not on the position of towns in the urban hierarchy
but on proximity to the Reserves.
The aim of this paper is to examine the policy of
industrial decentralisation in the light of the avail-
able body of regional economic theory.2 This may
throw further light on the reasons for the dis-
crepancy between the ideal and the practice of
separate development, and provide some indication
of the likely results of present policy.
Decentralisation - Theory and Policy
The policy instruments adopted to encourage
decentralisation, and the results achieved, are
broadly similar to those of other countries which
have attempted to disperse industry. Decentralisa-
tion programmes in most countries date back only
since the war and have had no well-developed body
of economic theory on which to draw; the interest
of economists in the spatial distribution of eco-
nomic activity is only a comparatively recent one
and regional economic theory is at present in a state
of disarray [Friedmann, 1979].
Regional theory draws on location theory. But
when location theory and the available empirical
evidence on location decisions are distilled, only
three useful points emerge. These are: i) the dif-
ferences between locality-bound and footloose
industries; ii) the strong influence of agglomeration
economies; and iii) the importance in decision-
making of the personal (and often subjective) pre-
ferences of entrepreneurs. Thus industrial decen-
tralisation is likely to be most successful in those
regions possessing a raw material base and/or a
market potential, able to develop agglomeration
economies at the growth centre(s), and able to
create an attractive living environment.
Yet these may not be sufficient conditions for the
success of growth centres, the concept on which
most mixed economies have based their decentrali-
sation efforts. The idea behind this concept is that
government will provide the physical infrastructure
(serviced industrial estates) and financial incentives
(investment subsidies, tax concessions and so on) in
the hope that these will attract private investment
on a scale sufficient ultimately to provide condi-
tions of self-generating growth without such aid.
However, accumulated experience over the years
has shown the growth centre concept to have a
2 Industrial decentralisation and homeland development are dis-
cussed in greater detail by the author in R. Schrire (ed), South
Africa: Public Policy Perspectives, Juta, Cape Town (forth-
coming)
number of important weaknesses, and these are
borne out by the South African example.
First, the three location factors mentioned above
are more likely to be met in existing largish towns
than in artificjally-created growth points (as growth
centres are officially called in South Africa). Thus it
is no accident that the growth points most success-
ful in attracting industry have been either existing
large centres or those located on metropolitan
peripheries. But the imposition of a racial con-
straint meant that small towns with little natural
growth potential have been designated as growth
points and that some industrial estates and associ-
ated new towns have been established in remote
areas.
A second, and related, factor is that the success of
growth centre strategy depends on the designation
of only a few growth centres and the recognition of
those centres for a considerable period [Richardson
19711. In South Africa the failure of border areas to
generate economic activity in the homelands led to
the designation of growth points in the homelands,
while unemployment among Coloureds and
Indians also lead to the creation of growth points
for these two groups. Thus, rather than concen-
trating on the most favourable areas, the decentrali-
sation effort has been scattered - 21 growth points
by 1975 and financial assistance available in over
50 other towns! Within 10 years the three most
successful growth points had been deproclaimed;
the necessity to promote 'homeland' development
may well lead the government to deproclaim other
centres prematurely.
Third, as has been the case in Western Europe, the
government has found it necessary to offer increas-
ingly generous concessions, augmenting them on no
less than five occasions since 1960.
Fourth, government provision of physical infra-
structure and financial incentives does not mean
industrialisation will occur; this is left to the
private sector. Governments may, however, take
the lead in establishing heavy industries with high
linkages (eg iron and steel plants) at growth points
in an attempt to create an 'industrial complex'.
Examples in South Africa may be found at
Richards Bay and Newcastle. But such 'propulsive'
industries do not necessarily generate spin-offs;
they are often capital-intensive and their linkages
tend to be with markets and suppliers outside the
region in which they are located [Appalraju and
Safier 1976]. The state investments at Richards Bay
and Newcastle have coincided with economic re-
cessions and have thus far generated few local link-
ages, while at other growth points the industries
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which have been attracted have tended to be those
with low linkages.
The instruments of decentralisation referred to
above are persuasive in nature; governments have
preferred such approaches rather than coercion.
But the South African Government resorted to
coercion when it became clear that the flow of
Africans to the cities was continuing unabated. The
Physical Planning Act of 1967 provided for 'con-
trolled areas' in which the establishment or exten-
sion of factories could be prohibited. In the lexicon
of apartheid, 'extension' was defined as an increase
in the number of African employees! With the
exception of Natal and East London, all the major
industrial centres were declared controlled areas.
The Act caused great confusion and anxiety in the
private sector, and the government subsequently
allowed locality-bound and 'relatively White-
labour intensive' industries (defined as a ratio of I
White: 2.5 Africans and later 1 White: 2 Africans)
to continue to be located in the Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) regions, the
country's industrial heartland.
Permits waiving the provisions of the act may, how-
ever, be granted. In the first nine years of the Act,
90 per cent of the applications for exemption by
industrialists were granted, but the refusals never-
theless affected 102,000 potential African workers.
There are no data as to how the firms responded to
the refusals; judging from the number of jobs
created at growth points during this period, it
appears that very few were induced to locate at such
points. Nor could firms easily have substituted
Coloured or Indian labour for African; the textile
industry of the PWV region, for example, was
replacing upwardly-mobile Coloured workers with
Africans and was one of the Act's chief antagonists.
The scattered nature of growth points was exacer-
bated by the decision in 1968 to encourage indus-
trialisation in the 'homelands'. This was a reversal
of the government's rejection of the Tomlinson
Commission recommendations concerning indus-
trial development in the Reserves. The earlier view
that border area growth would spill over into the
Reserves was theoretically improbable. This ought
to have been grasped when the policy was finally
implemented in 1960, for by then the discussion
about capital migration y labour migration in
regional development strategy was well established
in the literature. It should have been clear that
border areas were conceptually inadequate to
stimulate 'homeland' growth; they involved neither
the location of industry in the 'homelands' nor per-
manent migration from them. The 'homelands'
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would therefore have to provide housing and urban
services for the industrial labour force without the
benefit of a concomitant growth of a corporate tax
base, and there would be a considerable leakage of
wages to the border areas. This has proved to be the
case; all the border areas have done is to perpetuate
the labour export function of the 'homelands'.
With the evolution of the homelands policy and the
acceptance by the government of the idea of politi-
cal independence, greater emphasis has been placed
recently on development planning. The major
objective of the government's homeland economic
policy is to absorb Africans resettled from CASA
[Benbo 1976]. Strong emphasis is therefore placed
on the establishment of towns and industries (and
consequently on physical planning). But the
creation often homelands implies the creation of at
least one growth point for each. This increases the
competition for industry between the core (CASA)
and the periphery (the homelands and the BLS
countries - Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) in
two major respects.
First, on the assumption that the homelands are
separate political entities, the South African
Government has prepared a National Physical
Development Plan (NPDP) which covers regional
development in CASA. Identified in the NPDP are
potential metropolitan regions and a number of
growth points with existing or potential locational
advantages over the homelands. Although some
homelands - Kwazulu, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana
- impinge upon metropolitan regions and large
towns in CASA and would not necessarily be at a
serious locational disadvantage, the growth points
selected are largely in remote areas of these home-
lands. Moreover, the homelands have to compete
with CASA in the incentives offered to industry.
Thus, for instance, homeland administrations have
tended to waive the 'agency basis' whereby in-
vestors were to be obliged to transfer ownership to
local concerns after 25 years. The problem is that
the periphery has to bargain with investors who
have a wide range of locations from which to
choose.
Second, the BLS countries are part of the Southern
African Customs Union which provides for a free
flow of goods and for the protection of infant
industries against South African products - the
latter clause, incidently, not being applied to the
independent homelands [Leistner 1977]. These
three countries are all trying to industrialise.
Industries wishing to produce for markets in the
rest of Africa (and the Third World) as well as the
customs union would, for political reasons, find
better locations than the homelands. In practice,
however, such firms are likely to be South African
rather than transnational, and BLS have thus far
attracted relatively few such enterprises, largely
because the risk perceptions are unfavourable
[Selwyn 1975].
The Impact of Decentralisation
What then have been the results of the decentralisa-
tion policy? It has been argued that three points
must be proved if such a policy is to be regarded as
successful [Cohen 1978].
That the policy stopped the metropolitan
regions from increasing their relative share of
total manufacturing employment. South Afri-
can data show that in 1938-70 the share of the
four metropolitan regions remained constant at
about 80 per cent. Thus the first decade of the
policy had little impact on the pattern; this
implies, of course, that the absolute difference
in numbers employed in these regions and else-
where increased. And the metropolitan regions
increased their share of total population.
That the policy attracted industrial investment
away from the metropolitan regions. The
present border areas and homelands contained
11.8 per cent of all manufacturing employment
in 1959-60 and 12.8 per cent in 1969-70.
Assuming that the share would have remained
constant at 11.8 per cent in the absence of a
decentralisation policy [Bell 1973b] only the
increase (amounting to 11,600 jobs) may be
attributed to the policy. Thus of 87,000 jobs
created (for all races) in the growth points
during this period, 75,400 would have been
created anyway.
That the investment resulting from the policy
resulted in a genuine dispersal as opposed to a
suburbanisation of industry. The most success-
ful growth points of the l960s - Pietermaritz-
burg, Hammarsdale and Rosslyn - represented
the latter, being essentially an outward exten-
sion of the Durban and PWV metropolitan
regions.
Whether or not the policy has been 'successful'
according to these three criteria, it is clear that
employment creation in the growth points has been
slow. Data for 1970-76 suggest even slower pro-
gress; by 1970 there were 61,500 Africans in
decentralised industries as against 82,100 in 1976
[South Africa 1977; Benso 1978]. The increase
seems low, but of course economic growth slack-
ened off in the l970s.
The success or failure of South African decentrali-
sation policy must be judged against the theoretical
foundations of growth centre doctrine as well as
against the aims of the government's separate
development policy which it was introduced to
serve. A recent study concludes that the growth
centre concept has failed as a tool of regional
development [Friedmann 1979]. But in mixed
economies we do not appear to have anything
better (the Soviet spatial production complexes are
analogous). The industrial complex type of growth
centre at a key location offers the best prospects for
building up agglomeration economies, attracting
further industrial and other investment, and stimu-
lating regional growth. If this view is correct, it
means that South Africa should probably have no
more than two or three growth points for the fore-
seeable future. This has serious implications for
industrial growth in the periphery. Industrial com-
plexes may perhaps best be established by massive
state investments, but it is doubtful whether the
South African core is sufficiently developed to fund
such investment in each homeland and sustain its
own growth. Thus the fourth largest metropolitan
region in the country (Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage) is
heavily dependent on the automobile industry and
has failed to attract a range of industries sufficiently
diversified to cushion it against the effect of an
economic recession. Moreover, some of the home-
lands lack a resource base - an indigenous rationale
- for industry. To the extent that industrial growth
is seen as important in homeland development
strategy, the theoretical base for the government's
homeland policy is weak.
It might be premature to write off decentralisation
as a failure when, as in most other countries, it has
been in operation for only 20 years. But the South
African programme, with its political objective,
must be viewed against the recommendations of the
Tomlinson Commission. It was estimated by the
commission that 20,000 industrial jobs per annum
would be required in the Reserves if separate
development were to succeed. This implied large-
scale public investment. That was 25 years ago, and
the achievements have been minimal. Not only has
little employment been generated in industry, but
the industries themselves have had weak linkage
effects and have failed to stimulate any significant
development in other sectors. Nor has the depen-
dence of the urban centres of CASA on African
labour been reduced or the political future of Afri-
cans in these centres resolved. It is true that the pro-
portion of the African population resident in the
homelands has increased since 1960, but this has
been the result rather of population relocation and
boundary changes than of deliberate decentralisa-
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tion. The best hope the peripheral areas have of
industrialising is not by attracting footloose
industries away from the core but by producing the
raw material inputs for processing plants. And in
many of the decentralised areas, the prospects for
resource-based industrialisation are poor, if not
totally non-existent.
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